The ‘General Good’ vs. ‘Local Prejudices’

I remember a member of the U.S. House of Representatives who, during a debate held at my high school, explained the tension between exercising his judgment on what he felt best served the country or voting solely to mirror the perceived will of his constituents.

The former is known as the “trustee” approach to representation and the latter as the “delegate” model.

While reading up on this subject, I came across the following: “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish politician, journalist, and philosopher, delivered that sentiment in his Nov. 3, 1774, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol.”

Burke said that a representative “ought always rejoice to hear” the “weighty and respectable opinion” of constituents, but not bend to “authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience.”

Replace the British Parliament with the American Congress where Burke calls it “a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.”

Of course, there are times when what an elected representative considers to be for the “general good” may not match “local prejudices.”

This is where Burke’s words from 252 years ago intersect politics in 2026 and, for this column, an election contest roiling Georgia’s Jewish community.

Today’s politics reduces complex issues to a simple equation — it’s either this or that, with nothing in between — that ignores nuance, context, or diversity of opinion.

A segment of the Jewish community believes that there is a “right” way for an elected representative who is Jewish — in this case a United States senator — to vote on matters related to Israel, and concomitantly, a “wrong” way.

In short, you are either with us or against us.

I have questions.

What are the criteria for voting the “right” way and who determines those standards?

What responsibility does a United States senator who is Jewish have to the Jewish community?

What expectations should the Jewish community hold for a United States senator who is Jewish?

[I say “a United States senator who is Jewish” rather than “a Jewish senator” because the senator represents all of the estimated 11.4 million residents of Georgia. The term “a Jewish senator” may suggest a particular obligation to the 1.3 precent of the state’s population that is Jewish.]

Today’s politics reduces complex issues to a simple equation — it’s either this or that, with nothing in between — that ignores nuance, context, or diversity of opinion.

There is a tendency in some quarters of the Jewish community to regard anything less than being absolutely “pro-Israel” as being “anti-Israel,” but what constitutes being “pro-Israel”?

Does it require supporting every action taken by an elected Israeli government? Does tolerance for a diversity of opinion in the Jewish community stop at the water’s edge, in this case where the Mediterranean Sea laps ashore the Israeli coastline?

How we define “pro-Israel” frames how we evaluate, in this case, a senator’s votes on matters concerning Israel and his public statements on those votes.

I do not disparage those who favor the “delegate” approach to representation, but short of a referendum, how are elected representatives to know the will of their constituents, on Israel or any other issue?

Columns, op-eds, letters-to-the-editor, advertisements, or pronouncements by individuals or organizations may or may not reflect the majority sentiment in a community.

Voters tend to cast their ballots in favor of candidates with whom they feel the most comfortable or whose opinions they believe are sufficiently close to their own.

In the best of all worlds, we would elect our representatives based on our regard for their intelligence, trusting that they will act in the best interests of those who elect them AND the best interests of the nation as a whole.

When encountering the inevitable conflict between those interests, I lean toward Burke’s view: “Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

Any of us would be delighted if our elected representatives voted as we would, were we in their positions. I accept that there will be times when the results of the “trustee” approach may displease me.

The people elected to the U.S. House and Senate represent not only their district or state, but, to borrow from Burke, they are members of “a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole,” to favor the “general good” over “local prejudices.”

I doubt that voters give much thought to the “trustee” and “delegate” approaches of representation when they enter the polling booth.

But that is, to a considerable extent, the decision they make: Whether to vote for someone who will exercise their judgment to serve the country as a whole or someone who will put a figurative moist finger to the wind and vote to mirror the perceived will of their constituents — on Israel or any other issue.